Overview
Lecturer
Iulian Bogdan Dobra
Seminar tutor
Iulian Bogdan Dobra
Type of course
Compulsory
Language of instruction
English
Erasmus language
English
Domain
Finance
Field of study
Finance and Banks
Form of education
Full-time
Form of instruction
Class
Credit awarded by
Grade
Teaching methods
Lecturing, Demonstrating, Collaborating (i.e. Classroom discussion, Debriefing, Classroom Action Research), Recitation.
Entry requirements
-
Aims
These courses cover a number of topics related to competition policy and pricing
The objective is to provide a guide to all students who have an interest in competition issues
Also, following the course chapters, one can notice a set of pricing techniques, each of which might apply in some economic situations, market economy, but not in others. Finally this course is designed to teach students how to price goods.
Course contents
CH 1. Competition Policy: History, Objectives, and the Law
CH 2. Market Power and Welfare- short description
CH 3. Collusion and Horizontal Agreements
CH 4. Horizontal Mergers
CH 5. Vertical Restraints and Vertical Mergers
CH 6. Predation, Monopolisation and Other Abusive Practices
CH 7. Pricing Beyond the 3 Cs
CH 8. Pricing Economic Value to the Customer
CH 9. Pricing under Consumer Uncertainty
CH 10: Measuring Customer Reactions to Prices. Pricing to Segment Customers.
Learning outcomes
• To provide a systematic treatment of economics of competition policy;
• To deal with important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices and price discrimination;
• To formulate policy implications on aspects outline before.
Assessment
Written test examination– 70%; Verification during semester – 30%.
Recommended reading
• Bernheim, Douglas B. and Michael D. Whinston (1990), "Multi-market Contact and Collusive Behavior", Rand Journal of-Economics 21(1), 1-26;
• Green, E. and R. Porter (1984), ''Non-Cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information", Econometrica 52, 87-100;
• Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982), "Reputation and Imperfect Information", Journal of Economic Theory 27, 253-279;