Type of course: | Compulsory |
Language of instruction: | Romanian |
Erasmus Language of instruction: | English |
Name of lecturer: | Iulian Bogdan Dobra |
Seminar tutor: | Iulian Bogdan Dobra |
Form of education | Full-time |
Form of instruction: | Class |
Number of teaching hours per semester: | 48 |
Number of teaching hours per week: | 3 |
Semester: | Summer |
Form of receiving a credit for a course: | Grade |
Number of ECTS credits allocated | 3 |
These course cover a number of topics related to competition policy and pricing. The objective is to provide a guide to all students who have an interest in competition issues.
Also, following the course chapters, one can notice a set of pricing techniques, each of which might apply in some economic situations, market economy, but not in others. Finally this course is designed to teach students how to price goods.
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CH 1. Competition Policy: History, Objectives, and the Law CH 2. Market Power and Welfare- short description CH 3. Collusion and Horizontal Agreements CH 4. Horizontal Mergers CH 5. Vertical Restraints and Vertical Mergers CH 6. Predation, Monopolisation and Other Abusive Practices CH 7. Pricing Beyond the 3 Cs CH 8. Pricing Economic Value to the Customer CH 9. Pricing under Consumer Uncertainty CH 10: Measuring Customer Reactions to Prices. Pricing to Segment Customers.
Lecturing, Demonstrating, Collaborating (i.e. Classroom discussion, Debriefing, Classroom Action Research), Recitation.
• To provide a systematic treatment of economics of competition policy; • To deal with important issues as cartels, joint-ventures, mergers, vertical contracts, predatory pricing, exclusionary practices and price discrimination; • To formulate policy implications on aspects outline before.
Written test examination– 70%; Verification during semester – 30%.
• Bernheim, Douglas B. and Michael D. Whinston (1990), "Multi-market Contact and Collusive Behavior", Rand Journal of-Economics 21(1), 1-26;
• Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1990), "Horizontal Mergers, An Equilibrium Analysis", American Economic Review 80,107-125;
• Green, E. and R. Porter (1984), ''Non-Cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information", Econometrica 52, 87-100;